Powered By Blogger

Wednesday, January 25, 2012

anniversary

the 100th anniversary of Peirce's death occurs in 2014. does anyone want to help me arrange an anniversary conference?

Wednesday, October 6, 2010

Chapter Third & Final

     This is the third and last post about pragmatism, which is appropriate because Charles Sanders Peirce (1839-1914) thought in terms of thirds. I have only offered my speculations because I can. As we know, any idiot can post anything these days to most of the known planet. That doesn't make it significant. But I also offer this because it makes a lot of sense for the philosophically minded. So it's for any friends who may care to pursue this further on their own. If you do, you'll be mentally rewarded. You don't need to worry about where to look: It's estimated that if all of Peirce's written work were published, it would fill some 80 volumes.
      As the first two posts suggest {chapters 1 and 2, labeled somewhat tongue-in-cheekly!}, Peirce's thought is philosophical, but his philosophy of pragmatism is grounded in everyday pondering, the realm of thought specific to philosophy. So no one needs any special training to engage in philosophy, only sustained logical thought about mental phenomena from a starting point of inference about particulars. In this respect pragmatism is part of phenomenology. But it is also methodological, not spiritual -- it has no guiding principle other than to extend thought in ways logical and ethically practical within a setting of shared critical discourse in real-world contexts of thoughtful social communities. This is thought within relevant human contexts, making it practical and realistic and somewhat, by necessity, idealistic. Anyone familiar with Habermas will understand how much he owes to Peirce in the former's 'communicative ethics.' Of course, followers of John Dewey and William James, both far better known and better appreciated pragmatic philosophers, will also see how their pragmatic views are extensions of Peirce's own. James was a lifelong friend of Peirce, and Dewey studied under him. For a variety of reasons, Peirce's work has never been as popular, but it deserves to be.
     Perice's not wanting to doubt in philosophy 'what we would not doubt in our hearts,' does invoke natural feeling as an instinct specific to humans, and is the ethical core of pragmatism. Another way he expresses this, in a more logical sense, is to claim there's no such thing as intuition, but only a kind of natural feeling of what is inherently right 'in our hearts,' and that this is the rough, first-principle guide to ethical thinking. The pragmatic maxim, on the other hand, is the spelling out of where feeling evolves to, in more sustained thought, toward grounding in particular problems or existents ("seconds") and ultimately -- and finally -- toward "thirds," (the 'third grade of clearness') -- the logical extension of thought in establishing realistic, general principles for continued, ever greater and clearer extensions of thought. This third grade of thought is final or ultimate only in a provisional sense -- meaning it is more refinable into ever clearer grades of thought as 'particulars' becoming 'generals,' or general concepts for futher development. Understood this way, pragmatism is a social-scientific, evolutionary, realistic philosophy based in practical, everday logical thinking. Which means it has a communicative base.
     For journalism and communication studies generally, pragmatism can offer an important way of thinking through and about language and communication as semiotics -- 'sign' creation and extension. One possible limitation of pragmatism, however, is Peirce's insistence that 'all thought is in signs,' which is not really so controversial, but also that there are only three basic signs as objects of, or embodiment of, thought: icons, indexes, and symbols. But this rigid (even, let's face it, somewhat anal) labeling is not so unusual or inflexible when one understands that Peirce, like Aristotle and many other ancient thinkers in the realism-humanism mode, understood that all extended thought exists as images (icons), which are related, at the human level, to feeling, and that image and feeling encounter the actual world as more developed, existent reality (indexes), and finally as logically extendable into a range of representations (symbols), with 'the sign' itself as basic to all forms of communication, as 'semiosis' : sign creation and representation.
     All extended thought begins in icons and feelings, extends to real-world facts, and extends ultimately into higher-level symbolic meaning. A third implies and embodies a second, and a second implies and embodies a first. A first, however, is self-sufficient, as image or basic feeling. It implies nothing other than itself. So a symbol is nothing more than an extended (modified) index and icon, an index nothing more than an extended icon. So all thought, all signs occuring logically in this way, means thought begins as feeling, gains grounding in existence, and then continues and evolves further as mental extension, in ever more fixed representations, which themselves are unlimited in their further extension into clearer grades of thought. This describes in a fairly small nutshell the nature of semiosis (not to be confused with the dualistc French version more popular with post-modernists and post-structuralists). Peirce's semiotics is triadically based on firsts, seconds, and thirds.
     The usefulness of pragmatism should be obvious for communication studies in general, but also for understanding how journalism works in a logical and ideally objective sense, how language and rhetoric function, and how art, artificial intelligence and digital communication are all fundamentally based in the use of icons, indexes and, at the metaphoric level, symbols, the furthest level of sign development. (In fact, Peirce equated the third grade of clearness -- symbolic thinking -- with rhetoric, but never actually wrote much about that connection.)
     Even more basically, pragmatism -- developed within Darwin's (re)evolutionary framework of organic continuity, as Peirce was very strongly influenced by Darwin's views -- is about the changing nature of human thinking itself, within a communicative sense of symbolic reality. It is evolutionary theory applied, more or less, to communication. When Peirce claims that even matter itself is nothing but developed mind, you know he's being consistent in his contention that 'all thought is in signs.' His pragmatic philosophy gives us a scientific but humanistic way -- a general method -- to understand the evolving nature of all thought, language, meaning, and communication. His work deserves a closer reading than it's yet received.
     In the Information Age, Peirce may finally get his proper hearing, nearly 100 years after his death.
   

Tuesday, October 5, 2010

chapter 2 - the pragmatic maxim

"it appears, then, that the rule for attaining the third grade of clearness of apprehension is as follows: consider what effects, that might conceivably have practical bearings, [that] we conceive the object of our conception to have. then, our conception of these effects is the whole of our conception of the object." Peirce, 1906.

Comment: This is the maxim, the governing rule, of pragmatic thought, in that it explains that to understand any relatively complex object -- mental phenomenon -- at the third grade of clearness -- meaning, at its symbolic or highest level (its third stage -- beyond a mere image [first grade of clearness] or simply an indication [second grade of clearness) -- we examine the likely effects or outcomes this object of thought will have in a practical setting. it means we can, with sufficient thought, determine likely effects, therefore ultimate meaning, through sustained reflection in terms of practical (pragmatic) outcomes or effects. though somewhat idealistic, as it must be, it is also realistic in that it is a grounding mode of reflection on particulars leading to general practicalities, general realities. such reflection leading toward generalized thought is sufficient to cover every reasonably conceiveable aspect of a thought or object, but does not and cannot shut off further inquiry. in fact, in this respect inquiry never truly ends, it continues into greater and more nuanced 'grades of clearness.' this is really the ideal-practical basis for all modern scientific thought, or more basically, all logical thought. it is also important in, for example, journalism, because it helps us understand the ideal of objectivity as a pragmatic goal of 'daily' understanding.

Sunday, October 3, 2010

Pragmatic Ponderings: Chapter One

Pragmatic Ponderings: Chapter One: "'Let us not doubt in philosophy what we do not doubt in our hearts.' Who said it -- or something very like it?"

Chapter One

"Let us not doubt in philosophy what we do not doubt in our hearts." Who said it -- or something very like it?